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Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of
Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal
Rachel E. Barkowt & Mark Oslertt
The use of the pardon power is a necessary element in a fully functioning sys-
tem of criminal law. Recent presidents, however, have largely ignored this power-
ful tool, even as many have sought to expand the power of the office in other ways.
This Essay seeks both to describe the costs of this trend and to propose important
structural reforms to reverse it. Specifically, we advocate for the creation of a clem-
ency commission with a standing, diverse membership. While this commission
should have representation from the DOJ and take the views of prosecutors seri-
ously, the commission itself should exist outside the Justice Department, and its
recommendations should go directly to the White House. This new model of clem-
ency should also pay attention to data, both to create uniform standards and to
focus the use of the pardon power as a management tool. An emphasis on data will
also help the new pardon commission make evidence-based decisions about risk
and reentry. This is the time to create a better machine of mercy that will serve the
Constitution's mandate no matter who holds the presidency.
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INTRODUCTION
The morning of March 30, 2010, presented a remarkable
moment. The US Supreme Court was hearing argument in Dil-
lon v United States.' The case concerned whether Percy Dillon, a
convicted crack dealer, could receive a reduction in his sentence
based on postconviction rehabilitation.2 It was going poorly for
Dillon: the Court seemed disinclined to consider the relief that
he sought. Then things took a dramatic turn. As then-solicitor
general Elena Kagan looked on in surprise from the counsel ta-
ble, Justice Anthony Kennedy pointedly raised an unexpected
issue in the following exchange with Assistant Solicitor General
Leondra Kruger:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: The Petitioner's brief opens with a
statement about his rehabilitation. We don't know if that
has been contested. You don't respond to it. But let's assume
that's all true. He established schools, and he helped young
people and so forth. Does the Justice Department ever make
recommendations that prisoners like this have their sen-
tence commuted?
MS. KRUGER: I am not aware of the answer to that, Jus-
tice Kennedy. It is certainly true that evidence of that type
of rehabilitation factored into the government's recommen-
dation in this case that Petitioner-
JUSTICE KENNEDY: And isn't the population of prisoners
in the Federal prisons about 185,000 right now?
MS. KRUGER: I think-
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I think it is. And were there-how
many commutations last year? None. How many commuta-
tions the year before? Five. Does that show that something
is not working in the system? 185,000 prisoners? I think
that's the number.
MS. KRUGER: I-I'm not prepared to speak to that ques-
tion today, Justice Kennedy. 3
This unusual exchange reflects a state of crisis in an often-
hidden corner of criminal law: the use of the pardon power as a
necessary element in a fully functioning criminal-justice system.
1 560 US 817 (2010).
2 Id at 822-23. Dillon sought this reduction based on a retroactive reduction in the
Sentencing Guidelines relating to crack offenses. Id at 823.
3 Transcript of Oral Argument, Dillon v United States, No 09-6338, *40-41 (US
Mar 30, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/E57X-PDNG (paragraph breaks omitted).
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The Framers took the pardon power seriously, creating it as a
virtually unchecked power of the presidency.4 Recent presidents,
however, have largely ignored this powerful tool, even as some
have sought to expand the power of the office in other ways.5
This Essay seeks both to describe the costs of this trend and
to propose important structural reforms to reverse it. Presidents
may have different substantive standards for when the use of
clemency is appropriate, and clemency rates may therefore rise
and fall according to who holds the presidency.6 However, the
current administrative process for reviewing clemency petitions
stands in the way of just about any vision that a president may
have about invoking this authority. Recent presidents across the
political spectrum-from President Bill Clinton to President
George W. Bush-have been unable to systemically grant clem-
ency even when they have wanted to do so.7 If the wisdom of the
Framers is to be respected, each gear in the machine of the gov-
ernment that they created must be kept in good order-
clemency is no exception simply because the power itself is so
sweeping. Indeed, clemency stands as a case study in how poor
administrative design can foil even broad substantive powers.
Taking clemency reform seriously is particularly important
now. After a first term in which he granted fewer clemency peti-
tions than any modern president, President Obama has signaled
that he intends to take a more vigorous approach to clemency in
his second term. In the first several months of 2014, that meant
replacing the pardon attorney, actively soliciting more petitions
that meet the president's announced criteria, 9 encouraging US
Attorneys to support clemency in some cases, 0 and temporarily
4 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 Harv L Rev 1332, 1345-46 (2008). See also Part I.E.
5 For example, President Barack Obama and some of his predecessors have sought
to enlarge the president's war powers. See Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison,
Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum L Rev 1097,
1099-1100 (2013); Michael D. Ramsey, Meet the New Boss: Continuity in Presidential
War Powers?, 35 Harv J L & Pub Pol 863, 863-64 (2012).
6 See Jeffrey Crouch, The President's Power to Commute: Is It Still Relevant?, 9 U
St Thomas L J 681, 685-86 (2012) (discussing variation in clemency rate by president).
7 See Part L.C.
8 US Department of Justice, Press Release, Announcing New Clemency Initiative,
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Details Broad New Criteria for Applicants (Apr
23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S93G-AKAU.
9 Id.
10 Id (noting that "Deputy Attorney General Cole sent a letter to all of the 93 U.S.
attorneys asking for their assistance in identifying meritorious candidates"). At the NYU
Center on the Administration of Criminal Law's annual conference in 2014, Kathryn
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assigning more lawyers to the Office of the Pardon Attorney to
process clemency petitions." These initiatives will likely assist
President Obama in achieving his stated goals for clemency,
which are focused on granting commutations to individuals who
would be sentenced differently today based on changes in the
law.12 It is not a model of structural reform but a plan to work
within the existing framework to find and process more cases in
which to grant commutations based on factors outlined specifi-
cally by the president.13
While we applaud the president's efforts, we believe that
lasting, meaningful clemency reform requires more. Specifically,
the clemency process should be restructured to achieve its con-
stitutional functions not only for this president, but for all presi-
dents. Future presidents may not want to limit commutations to
only those situations in which a change in the law would dictate
a change in sentence. They may wish to have pardon attorneys
look for injustices in individual cases based on the specific facts
of those cases, even if the underlying law has not changed. They
may wish to use clemency as a means for policing federal prose-
cutors who exercise their discretion in a way that does not corre-
spond to the president's and attorney general's policies. They
may also seek more insulation from political criticism and a pro-
cess that is based as much as possible on what we know about
the relationship between recidivism, length of sentence, collat-
eral consequences, and rehabilitation. None of these goals can be
achieved under the announced Obama reforms. These goals re-
quire more than a shift in resources and personnel. They require
wholesale structural change.
Part I of this Essay sets the stage for the discussion by con-
sidering the fading of the pardon power and the rusting out of
the clemency process. It then explores the costs of this develop-
ment. First, and perhaps most obviously, a decline in clemency
exacerbates the problem of overincarceration in the federal sys-
tem, as very few prisoners receive commutations of their sen-
tences.14 Compared to other factors, such as lengthy mandatory
Ruemmler, counsel to Obama, noted that the president had recently conveyed his inter-
est in clemency to US Attorneys.
11 DOJ, Press Release, Announcing New Clemency Initiative (cited in note 8).
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See Terry Carter, Prison Break: Budget Crises Drive Reform, but Private Jails
Press On, 98 ABA J 44, 51 (Oct 2012).
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minimum sentences, 15 the absence of a vigorous commutation
policy may not seem significant, but it nonetheless contributes
to the problem of overincarceration. Second, the falling away of
the pardon power risks atrophying the process mechanism. It
seems that exactly this has happened, based on reports of how
the Office of the Pardon Attorney has functioned in recent
years. 16 Third, if commutation is functionally unavailable, it
puts pressure on other mechanisms available to prisoners, such
as habeas corpus, coram nobis, and other appeals to courts.1'7
Finally, if the pardon power goes unused, the system becomes
unbalanced. The Framers intended clemency to serve as a check
on overreach in punishing criminals. If clemency is abandoned
by the executive branch, the structure as a whole is strained.
Considering the costs of not using clemency obviously high-
lights the benefits of reinvigorating it: a renewed commitment to
clemency can help address the problem of mass incarceration,
improve the process mechanism, reduce pressures on other early
release mechanisms, and bring new balance to the system. But
there are other possible benefits to a robust clemency system,
particularly if it is reconstructed. Part II will suggest reforms
that yield additional benefits.
The key is the abandonment of the current bureaucracy in
favor of a new institutional structure. Embedding a single offi-
cial (the pardon attorney) deep within the DOJ has proven to be
a failure.18 Instead, review of clemency petitions should be en-
trusted to a commission that has a diverse, standing member-
ship that includes key conservative representatives who are par-
ticularly sensitive to victim interests and public-safety concerns.
Having these voices on the commission will ensure that these in-
terests are given significant weight and will also provide the
president with political cover when he opts to grant clemency
because he will have the backing of a bipartisan group that can-
not be accused of being soft on crime or insensitive to public
safety. And while this commission should have representation
from the DOJ and take the views of prosecutors seriously, the
15 See Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System *83
(US Sentencing Commission, Oct 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/LAD3.LGFM.
16 See Part I.C.
17 See Part I.D.
18 See Part IC (arguing that the institutional placement of the Office of the Pardon
Attorney has not only yielded a lower number of grants but has also atrophied the clem-
ency process as a whole).
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commission itself should exist outside the Justice Department
and its recommendations should go directly to the White House.
This institutional shift will help alleviate the prosecutorial
bias in decisionmaking that exists within the Justice Depart-
ment and that handicaps the ability of the Office of the Pardon
Attorney to police prosecutorial abuses. 19 It will allow clemency
to serve as a check on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
promoting uniformity. Clemency, seen in this light, can help
bring uniformity to prosecutorial decisionmaking in much the
same way that the creation of the independent Sentencing
Commission helped bring uniformity to the exercise of judicial
discretion in sentencing.20
Just as the success of the Sentencing Commission rests on
data collection, the success of this new model of clemency should
also pay attention to data. This would both create uniform
standards and employ the pardon power as a management tool
that allows the president to properly use clemency as a check on
enforcement policies that have proven themselves to be too
harsh and on the unwise use of prosecutorial discretion even
under existing policies. An emphasis on data will also help the
new pardon commission make evidence-based decisions about
risk and reentry.
Over the past three decades, the pardon power has too often
been ignored or used to create calamities rather than cure
them.21 Presidents seem to realize that the system is not work-
ing only at the end of their time in office, when they feel safe in
giving grants but become aware of the fact that the system does
not produce many recommendations for doing so, even when
asked. There is thus a last-minute scramble to find cases to
avoid a charge of being unmerciful or perhaps to fill what is
19 See Part I.C (discussing prosecutorial bias in the Office of the Pardon Attorney).
For further discussion of prosecutorial bias in the DOJ, see Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecu-
torial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 Va L Rev 271,
312-19 (2013).
20 A 2004 Sentencing Commission study found that the Guidelines have been large-
ly successful in eliminating interjudge and regional disparities for most types of crimes.
See Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal
Criminal Justice System Is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform *140-43 (US Sen-
tencing Commission, Nov 2004), archived at http:lperma.cd8K5H-236D.
21 The pardon of Marc Rich and the commutation of Scooter Libby's sentence by Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush, respectively, are examples of public scandals that damaged
the public perception of the pardon power. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of
the Pardon Power, 100 J Crim L & Crimin 1169, 1195-1204 (2010).
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finally recognized as a duty of the office.22 But clemency deserves
to be more than an afterthought. It is time to view clemency re-
form as a priority for the office of the presidency no matter who
holds the position. This is the time to create a better machine
of mercy.
I. THE COSTS OF A LATENT PARDON POWER
A. The Fading of the Principled Pardon Power
Within the course of about one month, two thoughtful doc-
uments emerged from the conservative Heritage Foundation and
the progressive American Constitution Society (ACS). What was
striking was their broad agreement. Writing in a Heritage
Foundation Legal Memorandum, Paul Rosenzweig concluded
that, "[d]espite its prominence throughout the history of the
American Republic, the pardon power is seldom used today.23
He called for an institutional solution with a new review struc-
ture.24 Just weeks later, former US pardon attorney Margaret
Colgate Love wrote a comprehensive piece for ACS, similarly
lamenting that "[flor the past thirty years presidents have been
increasingly reluctant to use their constitutional power to par-
don,"25 and calling for the consideration of new processes. 26
When writers for the Heritage Foundation and ACS agree
on a problem's importance (and its remedy), something notewor-
thy is going on. Indeed, the fading of the pardon power as a reg-
ular, expected task of the president is both real and unmistaka-
ble. The numbers tell the story.
Until relatively recently, use of the pardon power (which in-
cludes both the shortening of sentences through commutation
and traditional pardons) has been a regular part of a president's
duties. In just his first two years in office, President Abraham
22 See Part I.C. Clinton, for example, ended his presidency in exactly this way: as
the end of his term approached, he expressed regret over his anemic exercise of the par-
don power and announced 177 new grants on his final day in office. See Love, 100 J Crim
L & Crimin at 1195-1200 (cited in note 21).
23 Paul Rosenzweig, A Federalist Conception of the Pardon Power *1 (Heritage
Foundation Legal Memorandum No 89, Dec 4, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/LWY3
-2236.
24 See id at *7-8.
25 Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process: What the
President Can Learn from the States *3 (American Constitution Society, Jan 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/GH4K-RF9R.
26 See id at *18-21.
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Lincoln granted clemency to several hundred soldiers and over
two hundred civilians.27 Looking at statistics for the first terms
of later presidents, the numbers consistently reflect a vital
clemency power even well after World War II. Considering just
commutations,28 President Franklin D. Roosevelt granted 309
sentence reductions in his first term, while Presidents John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson commuted 100 and 226, re-
spectively, during their presidencies; even President Richard
Nixon granted 48 commutations in his first term. 29 In contrast,
President Obama granted precisely one commutation petition
during his first term. 30
The 1970s, and particularly the tenures of Presidents
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, represented a turning point.
Ford used the pardon power in two very different and remarka-
ble ways. As history well remembers, he pardoned his predeces-
sor, Nixon, for crimes that Nixon may have committed in office.31
The Nixon pardon rocked the nation on September 8, 1974.32
Less well remembered is a program that Ford had announced
just three weeks prior. In an August 19, 1974, address to a Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars convention (whose members were
aghast), he set out a program to pardon large numbers of con-
victed draft evaders and army deserters. 33 Though they were
controversial, both these initiatives can be described as princi-
pled actions aimed at national healing after traumatic events.
After Ford, Carter echoed his predecessor's work in issuing
an amnesty for draft evaders who had not been convicted, some
27 Love, 100 J Crim L & Crimin at 1170 (cited in note 21). For year-by-year statis-
tics, see US Department of Justice, Clemency Statistics, archived at http://perma.cc/
W22H-KWT4.
28 Our thesis mainly addresses commutations, so we focus on them here. Presidents
nearly always grant far more pardons than commutations.
29 DOJ, Clemency Statistics (cited in note 27).
30 Id.
31 For the text of Ford's proclamation and his accompanying remarks, see Gerald R.
Ford, President Gerald Ford's Pardon of Richard Nixon, 13 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 207
(2001). Ford's proclamation of the pardon claimed that the action was necessary to avoid
a "prolonged and divisive debate." Id at 208.
32 Ford may have picked the date in a failed attempt to hide the news behind an-
other (even more bizarre) national event: Evel Knievel's attempt to jump the Snake Riv-
er Canyon on that same day. See Laura Kalman, Gerald Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and
the Rise of the Right, 58 Cleve St L Rev 349, 360 (2010).
33 See id at 353 & n 48.
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of whom had fled abroad3 And, with that, the era of presidents
using the pardon power for a broad and principled purpose
seemed to come to a close. Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clin-
ton, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush seemed content to
use the pardon power sporadically and inconsistently and cer-
tainly did not use it to promote policy initiatives.35 Especially
telling was the declining rate of petitions granted during this
period: Kennedy granted 40.9 percent of all clemency petitions
ruled on or closed (for both pardon and commutation), and the
presidents between Kennedy and Reagan granted over 21 per-
cent of all petitions. Then the decline began: Reagan granted
12.6 percent of all petitions, George H.W. Bush 4.5 percent,
Clinton 9.2 percent, and George W. Bush 1.65 percent (and only
11 of 9,732 commutation petitions).36
Obama's record has been strikingly inconsistent, with a first
term nearly devoid of clemency grants (only 0.06 percent of peti-
tions ruled on or closed).37 At the time of this writing, Obama's
second term is witnessing the creation of an unusual, extraordi-
nary, and (importantly) temporary clemency process that ap-
pears poised to grant hundreds, if not thousands, of petitions of
individuals seeking sentencing reductions in situations in which
they are serving long sentences that would not be issued under
current law and for which they did not commit acts of violence.38
The remarkable slowdown in clemency through the regular
process coincided with a larger event that compounded its ef-
fect-the elimination of parole in the federal system through the
34 Carter wasted no time, issuing the amnesty proclamation on his first full day in
office. See Allen Pusey, Jan. 21, 1977: Carter Pardons Vietnam-Era Draft Dodgers (ABA
Journal, Jan 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/FG2X-EMWZ.
35 See Love, 100 J Crim L & Crimin at 1194-95 (cited in note 21) (detailing how,
from the 1980s onward, prosecutorial control over pardon recommendations created a
situation in which "pardon practice served primarily to ratify the results achieved by
prosecutors, not to provide any real possibility of revising them"). See also Part I.B
(providing examples of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations' failures to
use the pardon power in support of stated policy aims). Importantly, Ronald Reagan's
"amnesty" for undocumented immigrants was accomplished through legislation, not via
the pardon power. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub L No
99-603, 100 Stat 3359, codified as amended in various sections of Title 8.
36 DOJ, Clemency Statistics (cited in note 27).
37 Id (indicating that, through 2012, Obama pardoned just twenty-two people and
commuted only one sentence).
38 See James M. Cole, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the Press Conference
Announcing the Clemency Initiative (Apr 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4CR7
-SJBH; Stephanie Condon, Obama to Consider More Clemency Requests from Nonviolent
Drug Offenders (CBS News, Apr 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7A53.ENZN.
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.39 Thus, the two principal fea-
tures of second-look sentencing in the federal system shut down
simultaneously, one through legislative action and one through
executive disinterest. Clemency is the more remarkable of the
two, however, because unlike parole, the pardon power exists as
a creation of the Framers. The remainder of this Part will cata-
logue some of the costs of this systemic failure of what the Su-
preme Court has called the "fail safe" mechanism of our
criminal-justice system. 40
B. Overincarceration and the Desuetude of Clemency
Certainly, the falling away of clemency has not been a pri-
mary cause of what many perceive to be a wave of overincarcer-
ation in the federal system. Even under those presidents who
most frequently utilized their pardon power, the number of peo-
ple offered commutations was only a fraction of the inmates held
at that time. 41 A telling example is the only attempt, prior to
Obama's, to release prisoners sentenced to long terms for
narcotics-related violations because those sentences were viewed
as too harsh. That program was initiated by Kennedy and led to
the release of more than three hundred inmates perceived to
have been oversentenced under the Narcotics Control Act of
1956.42 While this effort was historic (if quiet),43 it affected only a
tiny part of the federal inmate population.44 That small reduc-
tion was more than nothing, of course-particularly if you hap-
pen to be one of the people released from prison.
A regular, conscientious clemency program will probably
never act broadly enough to substantially affect prison numbers
directly. However, we should not dismiss indirect effects too
39 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified as amended at 18 USC §§ 3551-3742
and 28 USC §§ 991-98.
40 Herrera v Collins, 506 US 390, 415 (1993) (quotation marks omitted).
41 See DOJ, Clemency Statistics (cited in note 27).
42 Pub L No 84-728, 70 Stat 567 (1954), codified at 26 US § 7237. See also Love, 100
J Crim L & Crimin at 1191 n 89 (cited in note 21); Charles Shanor and Marc Miller,
Pardon Us: Systemic Presidential Pardons, 13 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 139, 142-43 (2001).
43 See Shanor and Miller, 13 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) at 142 (cited in note 42) (noting
that this pattern of systematic clemency can be discerned only from a close reading of
the annual reports of the attorney general issued during the first few years of the
Johnson administration).
44 These roughly 300 commutations affected only approximately 1 percent of the
federal prison population, which in 1960 stood at 23,218. See Patrick A. Langan, et al,
Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, Yearend 1925-86 *1,
10 (US Department of Justice, May 1988), archived at http:/lperma.cc/CH8L-BN8H.
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quickly. Clemency has always played a role in signaling policy
goals in the continuing dialogue between the three branches of
government and within the executive branch itself. For example,
President Thomas Jefferson believed the Alien and Sedition
Acts 45 to be unconstitutional as a matter of law.46 As president,
though, he was limited in the actions that he could take. He
could not unilaterally strike down the law; as the Supreme
Court shortly made quite clear, it was the prerogative of the ju-
dicial branch to rule on the Acts' constitutionality. 47 Nor could he
repeal the law, as that was within the power of Congress. In-
stead, the tool that he had was the pardon power, and he exer-
cised that power to free those held under the Acts.48
Kennedy's actions, too, signaled his recognition of a problem
with the onerous Narcotics Control Act.49 The signal was even-
tually heeded, and the most objectionable provisions of that law
were repealed in 1970.50
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, significantly, passed over
a similar chance to signal their objections to the 100-to-1 ratio
between powder cocaine and crack cocaine that was embedded
in the federal Sentencing Guidelines and the statutory mini-
mums from 1986 to 2010. 51 Though both presidents publicly
voiced their objections to this disparity,2 neither backed this up
with the use of the tool in their hands--commutation. Either
could have signaled the need for reform by strategically com-
muting the sentences of a significant number of crack defend-
ants. But instead they squandered this power on clemency for
Marc Rich and Scooter Libby, signaling something less
45 Act of June 18, 1978 ("The Naturalization Act"), 1 Stat 566, repealed by Act of
Apr 14, 1802 ("Naturalization Law of 1802") § 5, 2 Stat 153, 155; Act of June 25, 1798
("The Alien Act"), 1 Stat 570 (expired 1800); Act of July 6, 1798 ("The Alien Enemies
Act"), 1 Stat 577, codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 21-24; Act of July 14, 1798 ("The
Sedition Act"), 1 Stat 596 (expired 1801).
46 See Shanor and Miller, 13 Fed Sent Rptr at 143 (cited in note 42).
47 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 177-78 (1803).
48 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 Geo Wash L Rev 521, 541
(2005).
49 See Shanor and Miller, 13 Fed Sent Rptr at 143 (cited in note 42).
50 See id at 142.
51 The 100-to-i ratio was adopted by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub L No
99-570, 100 Stat 3207, codified at 21 USC § 801 et seq, and it "treated every gram of
crack cocaine as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine." Kimbrough v United
States, 552 US 85, 96 (2007). Thus, the Act would have imposed equivalent sentences on
a defendant possessing 5 grams of crack cocaine and a defendant possessing 500 grams
of powder cocaine. Id.
52 See Shanor and Miller, 13 Fed Sent Rptr at 143-44 (cited in note 42).
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principled. Professor Jeffrey Crouch was blunt in concluding
that Clinton and Bush "succumbed to the temptation to use
clemency for their own personal reasons. 53
The importance of this signaling function is not limited to
the lines of communication between the president and the legis-
lature. It also serves as a notice of presidential priorities, which
is communicated directly to the people who make real-time
charging and plea decisions-the Assistant US Attorneys across
the country. Several layers of bureaucracy lie between the chief
executive and these key actors-the attorney general, the depu-
ty attorney general, a US Attorney, the criminal chief of that
office, and a unit supervisor-and priorities are easily diluted as
they are communicated down this long line. Clemency sends a
clear message to those line prosecutors about what matters to
the president.54
Clemency, then, has both a direct and indirect role to play
in controlling prison populations-particularly in the absence of
a parole mechanism-and disuse has a cost. We may now be see-
ing one of those costs, even as Obama has signaled that he will
use the clemency power to address the effects of overcharging
and oversentencing narcotics offenses in federal courts.55 The
need to commute the sentences of large numbers of people
through a special process is created in part by the fact that the
regular, systemic process has not worked. In other words, in-
stead of releasing steam regularly, the system has burst. That
herky-jerky reaction does not reflect a healthy, ongoing mecha-
nism. It would be far better to have released 125 people every
year over 8 years in office, carefully examining each petition and
thereby signaling when prosecutorial discretion to charge has
gone too far, rather than push through 1,000 pardons during the
last year in office.
53 Jeffrey Crouch, The Presidential Pardon Power 101 (Kansas 2009).
54 For an argument that clemency is a critical structural mechanism for the presi-
dent to control executive branch prosecutors, see Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and the
Unitary Executive, 90 NYU L Rev *49 (forthcoming 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
4KMK-G9XH.
55 See US Department of Justice, Press Release, President Obama Grants Commu-
tations and Pardons (Dec 19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5TAG-ZWKT (granting
eight commutations and thirteen pardons for individuals convicted of narcotics offenses);
DOJ, Press Release, Announcing New Clemency Initiative (cited in note 8).
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C. The Atrophy of the Clemency Process
By declining to conscientiously employ the pardon power,
recent presidents have not only failed to signal important policy
ideas. They have also affirmatively signaled something else: that
clemency itself is unimportant. That signal leads inexorably to a
certain lethargy in the process mechanism, and the evidence of
that lethargy within the current system is unmistakable.
When we come to expect nothing from the pardon power, lit-
tle attention is given to the process itself. The process of evalua-
tion becomes a process of denial, fulfilling low expectations re-
garding outcomes. A president can, of course, demand that more
petitions be advanced with positive recommendations, but for
some three decades this apparently did not happen (with the ex-
ception of last-minute requests by Clinton and George W.
Bush).56 Largely forgotten, during this period the Office of the
Pardon Attorney met the low expectations embodied in the ex-
ecutive's disinterest. This dynamic was magnified by the place-
ment of the evaluation process within the DOJ itself-after all,
the consideration of mercy takes place within a building largely
devoted to prosecution and punishment. 57
This idea about atrophy is not hypothetical; it is the reality
that developed within the Office of the Pardon Attorney through
the George W. Bush administration and the first years of the
Obama administration. A remarkable window into this period
was offered in a brief op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, published
on November 6, 2010, titled "A No-Pardon Justice Depart-
ment." 8 The author was Samuel Morison, who had worked in
the Office of the Pardon Attorney for ten years, well into George
W. Bush's presidency. What Morison described was alarming
and sad:
[T]here is a strong presumption within the pardon office
that the number of favorable recommendations should be
kept to an absolute minimum, regardless of the equitable
56 At the end of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies, the White
House began bypassing the DOJ and accepting petitions directly. See Love, 100 J Crim L
& Crimin at 1195-1203 (cited in note 21).
57 See Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J Crim L
& Crimin 593, 606 & n 80 (2012) ("All but a handful of the individuals officially respon-
sible for approving Justice Department clemency recommendations since 1983 have been
former federal prosecutors."). See also Part II.
58 Samuel T. Morison, A No-Pardon Justice Department (LA Times, Nov 6, 2010),
archived at http://perma.cc/9GAE-TDWN.
2015]
The University of Chicago Law Review
merits of any individual petition. .. . [T]he bureaucratic
managers of the Justice Department's clemency program
continue to churn out a steady stream of almost uniformly
negative advice, in a politically calculated attempt to re-
strain (rather than inform) the president's exercise of
discretion.59
This cycle of disfavor and disuse is difficult to break without
concerted action: The pardon attorney, embedded among prose-
cutors, protects the work of those prosecutors above all else. The
president, in turn, fails to use the pardon power. Clemency falls
out of the public eye, and the failure to use the pardon power
only affirms the continuing negativity of the pardon attorney.
An incident regarding a particular case reveals this dynam-
ic with even more precision. Dafna Linzer of ProPublica pursued
a series of stories regarding clemency and the federal pardon at-
torney in 2012 and 2013.60 Several involved Clarence Aaron, who
was serving a life sentence for his involvement in a drug con-
spiracy. As Linzer reported, an inspector general report blasted
Pardon Attorney Ron Rodgers for specific and troubling failures:
Aaron had won crucial support for a commutation from the
U.S. attorney in Mobile, Ala[bama], and the sentencing
judge there. But Rodgers, who opposed Aaron's release,
failed to accurately convey those views to the White House.
Acting on Rodgers's advice, President George W. Bush de-
nied Aaron's request for commutation in the final weeks of
his presidency.61
Within the realm of clemency, support from the prosecutor and
judge is both rare and important. The failure to report this in-
formation shows a striking devotion to consistent denials.62
Morison and Linzer describe a flawed system. It is not coin-
cidental that this level of dysfunction was reached after decades
of presidential disinterest in clemency. Had a president de-
manded more, the outcome may have been better. But because
presidents expected less, those expectations were fulfilled. Now
59 Id.
60 See Presidential Pardons: Shades of Mercy (ProPublica), archived at
http://perma.cc/VC4W-KGW5 (containing Linzer's full series).
61 Dafna Linzer, Head of Pardons Office Withheld Facts from White House in Key
Case (ProPublica, Dec 18, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/H2A6-MX7E.
62 See id. Aaron later had his sentence commuted by Obama. See Cora Currier,
President Obama Tells Clarence Aaron He Can Finally Go Home (ProPublica, Dec 19,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/L7EE.lYYJ.
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the system built on those low expectations no longer functions.
The fact that Obama has had to resort to an extraordinary work-
around of the pardon attorney-by soliciting petitions and hav-
ing the deputy attorney general announce the criteria for evalu-
ating those petitions-does not undermine this fact; rather, it
confirms it.
In addition, the more unusual clemency becomes, the more
each grant becomes newsworthy in itself and subjected to scru-
tiny. Given the politics of crime, presidents may be reluctant to
grant clemency because doing so has limited political upside and
each grant carries the risk of a political attack ad should the re-
cipient of clemency commit an act of violence. If clemency is rou-
tine and based on a defensible vetting process and the consistent
use of principled standards, the president has greater insulation
from such attacks.
D. The Erosion of Clemency Stresses Other Early Release
Mechanisms
As clemency becomes less relevant to criminal law due to
presidential inaction, it gives up its function as a fail-safe within
the criminal law system as a whole. This puts more pressure on
other pathways to second-chance review, such as the ancient
writs of habeas corpus, coram nobis, and audita querela.
Habeas corpus within the federal system, having suffered
the manhandling of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 199663 (AEDPA), is limited to correcting the grossest
of abuses raised by the most vigilant of prisoners.4 It is an ill-
fitting vehicle for the majority of worthwhile clemency petition-
ers, whose bedrock claim is simply that their sentence no longer
fits the person who they have become or the current standards
for a proportionate sentence. Pushing those whose claims should
rest on an appeal to mercy through a system of habeas that
rarely considers even the most worthwhile legal claims is a reci-
pe for failure at multiple levels. It simply clogs the system with
petitions that are destined to fail.
The writs of coram nobis and audita querela present a dif-
ferent dilemma. To see this at work, one need only look to the
63 Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified at 28 USC § 2254(d).
64 See Greene v Fisher, 132 S Ct 38, 43 (2011) ("[T]he purpose of AEDPA is to en-
sure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.") (quotation marks
omitted).
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work of Harlan Protass, an innovative criminal-defense lawyer
in New York City. Protass, having taken stock of the federal
clemency drought, concluded that "pardon/commutation is a
broken system that provides so minuscule a chance at relief that
making an application borders on a waste of time."65 He saw bet-
ter prospects in other forms of second-chance relief.
Specifically, Protass found success in pressing federal cases
through the use of FRCP 60. On its face, that Rule expressly
abolishes the writs of coram nobis and audita querela,66 but
Protass found ways to finesse that point, convincing courts that
the writs were eliminated only in civil cases.6 7 Coram nobis tra-
ditionally was issued by a court to correct a previous error of the
most fundamental character in order to achieve justice when
there are "extraordinary circumstances" and no other remedy is
available.68 Audita querela was also a British common-law writ
that allowed the consideration of new law or evidence.69
Even when it is successful, this use of an obscure civil pro-
cedure rule (which expressly bars the writs sought) is unstable
over time. It is likely that courts will try to push coram nobis
and audita querela into known pathways by construing them as
motions under 28 USC § 2255 that are subject to severe re-
strictions or by limiting their relevance to areas not covered by
28 USC § 2255. Already, courts of appeals have moved in this
direction.70 More simply, a flood of cases under this rule might
push the Supreme Court (or a majority of courts of appeals) to
simply hold that Rule 60(e) means what the government will
urge that it does-namely, that these writs have been abolished
in both civil and criminal actions. 71
65 E-mail from Harlan Protass to Mark Osler (Apr 7, 2014) (on file with authors).
66 FRCP 60(e).
67 Harlan Protass, The Mercy Project: Legal Primer *7-10 (NYU Center on Admin-
istration of Criminal Law Sept 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/R8QH-J89K.
68 Nicks v United States, 955 F2d 161, 166-67 (2d Cir 1992).
69 See United States v LaPlante, 57 F3d 252, 253 (2d Cir 1995). See also United
States v Holder, 936 F2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir 1991). For a helpful discussion of the distinction
between the writs of audita querela and coram nobis, see United States v Torres, 282 F3d
1241, 1245 n 6 (10th Cir 2002).
70 See, for example, Cherys v United States, 552 Fed Appx 162, 166-67 (3d Cir
2014) (concluding that coram nobis is generally not available to those who are "in custo-
dy" and asserting a claim under § 2255); United States v London, 523 Fed Appx 510, 511
(10th Cir 2013) (holding that the petitioner was "not entitled to a writ of audita querela
because he [was] in custody").
71 To get to this conclusion, though, the Court would have to deal with the language
of United States v Morgan, 346 US 502 (1954), which allowed a coram nobis petition and
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The reason that this matters is tied to the hopes and expec-
tations of prisoners. If an ancient writ offers hope, the word
spreads fast within prison.72 If all that prisoners have is a dream
of freedom, that dream will be tied to whatever balloon floats by.
Unfortunately, these ancient writs rest on very unstable legal
ground. Once courts come to a consensus, it is likely that these
balloons will have been popped, and those writs will be reduced
to less than a wisp in the law. The disadvantage of these writs is
that they do not even exist in statute (other than a declaration
of their abolition), meaning that courts can easily dispose of
them. In contrast, the pardon power, however maligned and ig-
nored, still rests squarely within the words of the Constitution.73
The pardon power will revive as a systemic fail-safe when and if
the will is there. It may not be ideal in implementation, but it
will, at the least, continue to be.
E. Clemency and the Balance of Power
It is clear that the Framers intended the pardon power not
only to be a vehicle for the ancient value of mercy but also to
play a role in the balance between the branches of government.
The importance of this role was significant enough to overcome
even the resistance of those who were generally suspicious of a
strong executive. 71
With striking foresight, the Framers identified the specific
problem that could be countermanded through the pardon pow-
er: the inevitable instinct of legislators, propelled by political
impulse, to create harsh sentences against unpopular criminals
that would prove disproportionate in particular cases. As
Alexander Hamilton put it in Federalist 74:
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the be-
nign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible
fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country
partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an
concluded that "[n]owhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to im-
pinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions." Id at 510-11.
72 See David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87
Harv L Rev 321, 322 (1973).
73 See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1 (giving the president the "Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment").
74 See Crouch, The Presidential Pardon Power at 14-15 (cited in note 53).
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easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, jus-
tice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel7 5
This argument, made some twenty-two decades ago, concise-
ly describes the imbalance that has plagued our federal system
of justice over the past three decades. Politicians reacted to pub-
lic and media alarms about drugs with the passage of harsh sen-
tencing laws without much attention to data and empirical evi-
dence. In time, we have come to realize that these laws were
sanguinary and cruel, at least as to some of those affected. The
tool for restoring balance-the pardon power-has sat latent as
the injustice has become clearer.
The pardon power is not sufficient (on its own) to reduce the
federal prison population.76 The legislature must do its job by re-
vising the laws and allowing retroactivity when appropriate. Yet
the clemency power of the executive has a role in keeping the
whole in balance and sending signals to prosecutors about how
those laws should be charged. When that power goes unused, or
when it is used without principle, the carefully balanced process
of criminal justice is subtly undone. The structure for clemency
must be rebuilt so that its intended function can be restored.
II. THE PATH FORWARD: REDESIGNING CLEMENCY
Reinvigorating clemency will help to minimize the costs dis-
cussed in Part I. But a renewed commitment to clemency can
bring even more benefits, particularly if there is a shift in its in-
stitutional design and decisionmaking focus.
One of the reasons that clemency has fallen by the wayside
is its institutional placement within the DOJ. There is an inher-
ent conflict of interest when the same department that prose-
cutes cases is asked to second-guess those decisions at the clem-
ency phase 77 This conflict became increasingly pronounced in
the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Justice Department
shifted responsibility over pardons to the deputy attorney gen-
eral-whose principal responsibility is to oversee federal prose-
cutions-and when a focus on tough-on-crime politics made the
Justice Department's law-enforcement efforts a key, high-profile
75 Federalist 74 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 500, 500-01 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob
E. Cooke, ed).
76 See Part I.B.
77 For a lengthier treatment of this intrinsic tension, see Barkow, 99 Va L Rev at
286-91, 312-19 (cited in note 19).
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aspect of presidential administration. 78 Given this conflict, it is
not surprising that the Office of the Pardon Attorney fails to
recommend grants, thereby frustrating presidents who want to
use the power.7 9 President George W. Bush, after failing to re-
ceive positive recommendations for clemency from the Office of
the Pardon Attorney even after his White House counsel re-
quested them, remarked that the process "is broken" and
"doesn't make any sense."80
It is hard to disagree with Bush's assessment. While it is
critical to get the views of the prosecutor who brought the case
initially and any other input from the Justice Department on
the merits of a grant, that information can be gathered by an-
other body that does not have the same conflict of interest in
weighing that assessment against other factors and infor-
mation.8l Whereas pardon attorneys in the Justice Department
will be prone to defer to the Department-not out of bad faith,
but because of a natural sense of confidence in the judgment of
Department prosecutors and in deference to the deputy attorney
general, who both supervises federal prosecutions and is in
charge of the pardon office-an actor outside that framework
can bring a fresh perspective when she evaluates the Justice
Department's position alongside other evidence as well as the
president's criminal justice policies.
A. Creation of an Independent Clemency Board
The key to strengthening clemency and maximizing its utili-
ty is to change this institutional structure by removing clemency
from the supervision of the Justice Department-an
78 See id at 288-89 (noting that the Reagan Justice Department explicitly sought to
"polarize the debate" on drugs and prisons to "further [its] agenda," and describing the
1978 shift in control over pardons).
79 President Clinton, for example, expressed "dissatisfaction with the general ap-
proach to clemency cases being taken by his own Justice Department," which led him to
turn to his lawyers in the White House to serve those functions. Presidential Pardon
Power, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Ju-
diciary, House of Representatives, 107th Cong, 1st Sess 25 (2001) (statement of Margaret
Colgate Love).
80 Peter Baker, Don't Go Away Mad: The Final, Heartfelt Conflict That Ended the
Bush-Cheney Partnership, NY Times Magazine 28, 32 (Oct 10, 2013).
81 See Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 NYU J L & Liberty 316,
337-38 (2014); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan L Rev 869, 883 (2009); Keith A. Findley,
Tunnel Vision, in Brian L. Cutler, ed, Conviction of the Innocent: Lessons from
Psychological Research 303, 303-04 (American Psychological Association 2012).
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institutional setup in which the prosecutorial perspective domi-
nates and the president does not receive an independent
assessment that insulates his decision from partisan deci-
sionmaking. President Obama's first White House counsel, Greg
Craig, reached this conclusion and argued in favor of an "inde-
pendent commission of former judges, prosecutors, defense at-
torneys and representatives of faith-based groups."82
While there is room for reasonable disagreement about
where it should be institutionally placed and who should be on
such a board, we believe that it is possible to outline certain
minimal requirements of such a body. First, it should be an ex-
ecutive branch institution because the pardon power is a core
executive function. Its membership should not be subject to con-
firmation by the legislative branch or subject to any other limi-
tations by the other branches.83 We thus envision a commission
that would serve solely at the pleasure of the president. While it
could be a freestanding agency within the executive branch or
placed within the White House counsel's office or elsewhere in
the Executive Office of the President,84 it should not be subject to
supervision by the DOJ because of the conflict created by
52 Dafna Linzer and Jennifer LaFleur, A Racial Gap for Criminals Seeking Mercy,
Wash Post Ai, A21 (Dec 4, 2011). Craig was not the first to advocate for placing clemen-
cy outside the Justice Department. See, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton's
Parting Pardon Party, 100 J Crim L & Crimin 1131, 1167-68 (2010) (advocating for the
placement of the Office of the Pardon Attorney within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent with reporting obligations to the White House counsel); Evan P. Schultz, Does the
Fox Control Pardons in the Henhouse?, 13 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 177, 178 (2001) (arguing
for shifting the pardon authority from the DOJ to the White House). See also Daniel T.
Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 Cap U L Rev 219, 231 (2003)
(arguing that "an administrative body, properly constituted, can improve the dispensing
of clemency" and "better decisions could well be forthcoming from a body that was truly
representative and comprised of individuals with expertise in the retribution and culpa-
bility issues surrounding clemency (psychologists, criminologists, lawyers, parole offic-
ers, clergy, etc.)").
83 Thus, although a body like the Sentencing Commission has the staff and capabil-
ities for the kind of data analysis that we propose, see Part II.C, its placement in the ju-
dicial branch and the fact that its members are subject to Senate confirmation would re-
strict the president's constitutional clemency power to too great an extent should the
Sentencing Commission have a role in clemency. In addition, the Sentencing Commis-
sion's membership lacks the kind of diversity that we believe is necessary for clemency
determinations. The Commission's most recent slate of seven voting members consisted
of five federal judges, a law professor, and a former White House counsel and US Attor-
ney. US Sentencing Commission, About the Commissioners (June 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/LGR3-S6BJ.
84 See Barkow, 99 Va L Rev at 330-41 (cited in note 19) (discussing the advantages
and disadvantages of various institutional placements).
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putting those responsible for prosecution in charge of second-
guessing those same prosecutorial decisions.
Although the number of pardons has fallen in jurisdictions
throughout the United States (and not just at the federal level),
some states have better-functioning clemency systems. Love's
important study of state practices found that the use of an inde-
pendent board was a critical factor in those nine states where
pardons continue to be granted on a regular basis.s5 This is not
sufficient, of course, as there are a number of states with inde-
pendent boards that rarely grant clemency.86 But the use of an
independent board does seem to be a necessary precondition to
improvement because it creates a layer of independence in the
decisionmaking process from law-enforcement biases and tough-
on-crime political concerns that may not represent smart-on-
crime decisions.
B. Composition of the Clemency Board
A second crucial aspect of a clemency advisory board is its
membership. Any advisory body on clemency should include rep-
resentatives from the range of interests that play a role in the
criminal justice process to ensure that all those interests are
represented and to increase the likelihood that the judgment of
the board is substantively sound as judged from the perspective
of that range of interests. We believe that the board should in-
clude the following: a former federal prosecutor; a former federal
public defender; someone with prior experience working in cor-
rections; someone who was formerly incarcerated; a former fed-
eral judge; a former probation officer; a former police officer; an
individual with private-defense experience; someone who has
worked with victims of crime or was a victim of crime and works
on those issues; and individuals from academia with expertise in
risk assessment and criminal justice policy, so at least one crim-
inologist, one psychologist, and someone who studies criminal
law and policy. Having former political officials could also be
beneficial, perhaps including former governors who had previ-
ously made clemency decisions.
The specifics of the membership criteria are less important
than the general goals. The central aim should be to create a
85 See Margaret Colgate Love, Relief from the Collateral Consequences of a Crimi-
nal Conviction: A State-by-State Resource Guide xi (Hein 2006).
86 See id at 23-26.
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group of individuals who bring all the relevant perspectives to
bear on the issues posed by criminal conduct and the need for
clemency and who will view their job on the board as apolitical.
The body should be politically balanced along the lines of the
Sentencing Commission and other independent agencies, with
Democrats and Republicans among its members. The goal
should be the creation of a bipartisan body that is not tilted in a
particular political direction or biased toward a certain
viewpoint.
Because of the politics of clemency, it is critical that the
group include validators for any president who wishes to exer-
cise this power more robustly. Thus, having former law-
enforcement officials and politicians who cannot be attacked as
soft on crime is beneficial for the success of this body. In the
model of President Nixon going to China, this body needs people
on it who can signal to the general public that a decision for
clemency is reasonable across a range of viewpoints. 87 Indeed, it
is critical that the commission have individuals with unassaila-
ble credentials on public safety and a concern for victim
interests.
C. Reliance on Data
The body itself should ground its decisions, as much as pos-
sible, in data. Currently, clemency decisions are viewed in isola-
tion, with each application assessed on its own merit and with-
out a systematic approach to how a case fits into a larger frame
of decisionmaking. Unfortunately, the ad hoc nature of this cur-
rent process has produced racially disparate outcomes and a
system that favors those few individuals with members of Con-
gress backing their application.88 A new model of clemency
should pay close attention to racial and other disparities to en-
sure that the process is not biased. Such a change requires thor-
ough data collection.
A focus on data could bring additional benefits by using this
decision point as an opportunity to check exercises of prosecuto-
rial discretion that can produce disparities in the system.8 9 Love
87 The most successful sentencing commissions follow this model of a diverse mem-
bership with commissioners who have influence with other political actors. See Rachel E.
Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L Rev 715, 800-04 (2005).
88 See Linzer and LaFleur, Wash Post at Al, A20 (cited in note 82).
89 See Barkow, 90 NYU L Rev at *48-50 (cited in note 54) (discussing clemency as
a tool for promoting uniformity in law enforcement).
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has observed that clemency can become a "useful policy and
management tool" for the president by giving him a "birds-eye
view of how the federal justice system is being administered, re-
vealing where particular laws or enforcement policies are overly
harsh, and where prosecutorial discretion is being unwisely
exercised."90
There is currently no body in the federal system that keeps
track of prosecutorial decisions across the ninety-three offices of
the US Attorneys, other than whatever metrics are kept by
prosecutors themselves in the DOJ and the information from the
DOJ and the courts that gets reported to the Sentencing Com-
mission.91 We know from existing data that there is a great deal
of disparity in how prosecutors charge cases and the sentences
that they pursue. For instance, there is wide variation in the
charging of crimes that carry mandatory minimum sentences.
One GAO study found that prosecutors in the Southern District
of Florida almost always filed mandatory minimum charges,
while prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York declined
to file the mandatory minimum over seventy times.92 In the
Eastern District of New York and the Southern District of Cali-
fornia, prosecutors dropped or reduced mandatory minimum
charges regularly, 93 while prosecutors in other districts, such as
the Central District of California, rarely dropped or reduced
charges after filing them.94
Recent data also indicate wide variation in charging repeat
offenders under the mandatory-minimum-sentencing provisions
of 21 USC § 851. "For example, in six districts, more than 75
percent of eligible defendants received the increased mandatory
minimum penalty as an enhancement. In contrast, in eight
90 Love, 100 J Crim L & Crimin at 1206 (cited in note 21).
91 See Brian D. Johnson, The Missing Link: Examining Prosecutorial Decision-
Making across Federal District Courts *86 (National Institute of Justice, 2010), archived
at http://perma.cc/CF4E-AWR5.
92 A 1993 study by the GAO revealed large disparities between districts in their
treatment of defendants whose offenses had the potential for mandatory minimum sen-
tences. See Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Are They Being Imposed and Who Is Receiv-
ing Them? *19-21 (GAO/GGD-94-13, Nov 1993), archived at http://perma.cc/84QK-B243.
93 In the Eastern District of New York, prosecutors dropped or reduced the charges
for 53 out of 125 defendants. Id at *19. In the Southern District of California, prosecutors
dropped or reduced charges for 55 out of 66 defendants. Id.
94 Id.
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districts, none of the eligible drug offenders received the en-
hanced penalty."95
Moreover, available data strongly indicate that there are
large disparities among the offices of the US Attorneys in their
willingness to file motions on behalf of defendants who offer
substantial assistance to prosecutors. For example, prosecutors
in the Southern District of Alabama were more than twice as
likely to file such motions than prosecutors in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Arkansas; prosecutors in the Central District of Illinois
were over three times as likely to file such motions as prosecu-
tors in the Southern District of Illinois.96 Undoubtedly there are
other charging and sentencing practices that differ among US
Attorneys' Offices, and the clemency board would be well suited
to track those variations.
Data-driven clemency would be a way to systematically
evaluate and smooth out those differences in line with the presi-
dent's enforcement policies. Because clemency works in only one
direction-to reduce sentences-the board itself would serve as
a check on only those offices that are charging too aggressively.
But nothing would stop other actors, such as the president or at-
torney general, from using the data to reformulate department
policy should the Justice Department decide that some districts
have been charging too leniently. And Congress could use the in-
formation to assess whether statutory changes are needed be-
cause of how those statutes are being applied. The point of the
clemency board would be to provide these data in a useable for-
mat, in the same way that the Sentencing Commission does
with respect to its data on judicial decisionmaking. Those data
are useful tools to a range of actors, and similar data on prose-
cutorial practices are just as vital.
Data collection on federal prosecutors could also help identi-
fy the areas in which those prosecutors may be prone to error. If,
for example, clemency is necessary when an individual
95 Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal
Justice System at *255 (cited in note 15). See also United States V Young, 960 F Supp 2d
881, 882 (ND Iowa 2013) (discussing the "the stunningly arbitrary application by the
Department of Justice ... of § 851 drug sentencing enhancements").
96 An Offer You Can't Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants
to Plead Guilty 124 (Human Rights Watch 2013). The Sentencing Commission notes,
"There appears to be no nationwide Department of Justice practice concerning the extent
of the reduction that should be recommended for any particular type of cooperation."
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences in the Federal Criminal Justice
System at *110-11 (cited in note 15).
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demonstrates innocence or identifies prosecutorial misconduct,
that should have a bearing on an individual's ultimate sentence
and may also signal something wrong in how particular types of
cases are handled. In this respect, the clemency board can oper-
ate like a conviction-integrity unit, which have been established
in state prosecutors' offices to look for errors in cases and estab-
lish mechanisms to avoid error in the future based on common
mistakes that are identified through that retrospective review.97
Finally, the clemency board could provide yet another useful
benefit through its collection of data on individuals who receive
clemency. Currently, the public receives information on individ-
uals granted some form of clemency only when the media high-
lights a case in which an individual reoffends after having been
given a break-what might be called the "Willie Horton bias."
What we lack is a systemic look at what happens in those cases
in which clemency produces a successful outcome. Under what
circumstances are grants of clemency successful? Can we quan-
tify those benefits in terms of costs saved on additional correc-
tions expenditures or state economic assistance that becomes
unnecessary because an individual successfully reenters and
gains employment? How do recidivism rates for those with clem-
ency compare with those who do not receive it? What conditions
are appropriately attached to pardons and commutations to en-
sure a successful reentry? A clemency board should be collecting
just this type of information so that the benefits can be weighed
against the costs and so that we can better identify those factors
that are associated with successful reentry.
The board would not be driven exclusively by data, of
course, because its focus would remain on correcting injustices
in particular cases. But those individualized decisions would be
better informed if the recommendations came from a board sen-
sitive to overall data patterns on race, recidivism, and prosecu-
torial practices. And positive grant recommendations would
mean more if they came from an expert, politically diverse body.
97 See Establishing Conviction Integrity Programs in Prosecutors' Offices *31-33
(Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/453Y
-ZBPB.
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CONCLUSION
Clemency occupies an odd place in American government
today. It is one of the greatest powers that the president has, yet
presidents have found themselves either unwilling or unable to
use it. While President Obama's recent efforts to pave the way
for more grants should be applauded, more could and should be
done to fix the federal clemency process. It should not be a tool
that presidents use only on their way out the door or to fix a
specific problem that the president identifies in advance (as
Obama appears ready to do with drug penalties that have been
changed). The process should be able to detect errors and injus-
tices that cannot be identified ex ante and even when laws
themselves have not undergone legislative change.
When the Framers spoke of the pardon power, they noted
that it was necessary because prevailing criminal law might be
too severe. They did not reserve it for retroactive adjustments,
nor did they think that all errors could be identified and correct-
ed in advance. Rather, they set up a mechanism to ensure that
justice could be done in every federal case. It is time to restruc-
ture clemency so that it fulfills this quiet but crucial
constitutional function.
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